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WHAT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SAY ABOUT THE SUPREME
COURT AND WHY IT MATTERS
CAROLYN SHAPIRO*
INTRODUCTION
At Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Sena-
tor Charles Grassley, the Republican chair of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, was the first to speak. His statement was a paean to the separation of 
powers and to the role of the judiciary in our constitutional system of gov-
ernment. Judges, he explained, play a “limited role. . . Judges are not free to 
re-write statutes to get results they believe are more just. . . [J]udges aren’t 
free to update the Constitution.”1 He went on: “And when judges don’t re-
spect this limited power, when they substitute their own policy preferences 
for those in the legislative branch, they take from the American people the 
right to govern themselves.”2 Grassley did not mention any particular cases 
or legal issues during his speech. Rather, he confined himself to this gen-
eral—and on its face, largely uncontroversial—description of the role of the 
judge, and he praised Gorsuch for understanding that role.
Senator Dianne Feinstein, the ranking Democrat on the Committee,
spoke next. In contrast to Grassley, Feinstein used most of her time to talk 
about specific issues and cases that she was concerned about. She noted the 
authority that the Supreme Court has over whether women “will continue to 
have control over [their] own bod[ies],” over voting regulations and cam-
paign finance, over environmental law, over gun regulation, over laws de-
signed to protect workers, and over the continued vitality of Chevron
deference.3 Towards the end of her remarks, Feinstein spoke a bit about ju-
dicial philosophy more broadly, in particular criticizing originalism as a 
* Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute on the Supreme Court of the United States 
(ISCOTUS), IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Christopher Schmidt for helpful 
comments, as well as participants in this Symposium. Additional thanks to Patrick Manion for excellent 
research assistance.
1. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on the Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be Associate 
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, FED. NEWS. SERV., Mar. 20, 2017, 2017 WLNR 8698078, at 3 [here-
inafter Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 5–7.
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method of constitutional interpretation. Originalism, she argued, “ignore[s] 
the intent of the framers” that the Constitution be “a living document, in-
tended to evolve as our country evolves.”4 She went on: “In fact, if we were 
to dogmatically adhere to originalist interpretations, then we would still have 
segregated schools and bans on interracial marriage. Women wouldn’t be 
entitled to equal protection under the law, and government discrimination 
against LGBT Americans would be permitted.”5
It was utterly predictable that Grassley would be supportive of Gor-
such’s nomination and that Feinstein would be skeptical. But there is an ad-
ditional striking difference between their remarks—and it is a difference that 
typifies contemporary Republican versus Democratic discussions of the 
Court. Grassley’s remarks focused explicitly and exclusively on process and 
on constitutional design.6 Feinstein’s primary focus, on the other hand, was 
on results. Even when she talked about methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion and criticized originalism, she did so largely by arguing that a strict 
originalist approach would lead to unacceptable results.
Put another way, a key difference between Grassley and Feinstein was 
their use of “process language” to describe the role of the judiciary in general 
and the Supreme Court in particular. Process language focuses on what 
judges are supposed to do, how they are supposed to be constrained, and how 
the constitutional separation of powers is supposed to work. When Grassley 
said that judges can’t rewrite statutes, he was using process language. When 
politicians complain about judges imposing their personal views, they are 
using process language. There is nothing inherently liberal or conservative 
about process language. Indeed, during the Lochner era, the left often em-
phasized such rhetoric.7 In more recent years, however, the left has been rel-
atively tepid about doing so, while such language, including explicit
invocations of the Constitution, has become a staple of the political right.
This Article explores the implications of this different use of process 
language by the right and the left, using the Gorsuch hearing as a focal point.
Part I briefly recounts a history of process language in confirmation hearings 
dating back to 1955. More specifically, this Part explains how and when sen-
ators on the political right have used such language during Supreme Court 
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 8.
6. The language he used is of course laden with implicit meaning readily understood by conserva-
tives and liberals alike. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Language of Neutrality in Supreme Court Confirmation 
Hearings, 122 DICKINSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 66–68); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 15–22.
7. See Catherine Cook, Legislating from the Bench, HARV. POL. REV. (Mar. 3, 2009), http://har-
vardpolitics.com/online/legislating-from-the-bench/ [https://perma.cc/CR6K-HSHG].
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confirmation hearings to defend and describe their preferred results, to con-
demn other outcomes, and to signal substantive positions to political follow-
ers.
Part II then turns to Justice Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing. This Part 
first analyzes the discussions of statutory interpretation during that hearing, 
comparing Democratic rhetoric about Gorsuch—being for the “big guy” 
over the “little guy”—to the Republican defense of his jurisprudence as be-
ing neutral and principled. I argue here that the Democrats could and should 
have criticized Gorsuch’s textualism by focusing both on its selective appli-
cation and on the ways that it distorts the relationship between the judiciary 
and the legislature. That approach would have allowed Democrats to couch
their concerns not in terms of whether Gorsuch prefers the “big guy” or “the 
little guy,” but in terms of whether his textualism undermines Congress’s 
own decisions about, for example, protecting workers—speaking directly to 
process and separation of powers concerns but without abandoning their fo-
cus on the important real-world effects of judicial decisions.
Part II then focuses on discussions about constitutional interpretation 
during the Gorsuch hearing, and it ties those discussions to the political 
right’s claims about the Constitution. Republican senators and the nominee 
alike promoted an originalist vision that they claim is dictated by fidelity to 
the Constitution. Democrats pushed back, as they did in the statutory inter-
pretation context, largely by pointing to unappealing decisions that an 
originalist might reach, but for the most part they did not offer an affirmative 
alternative. Here, too, I argue that the Democrats should not cede process 
language but should insist on the political and legal left’s vision of the Con-
stitution tied to its text, history, and principles. In conclusion, I argue that 
Democrats should see the confirmation hearings not only as an opportunity 
to question the nominee, but also as a chance to articulate their constitutional
vision to the American people.
I. THE EDIFICE OF PROCESS
Process language does not have an intrinsic political valence. Legal 
scholars, commentators, and judges across the political spectrum talk about 
how the judiciary does and should function in our constitutional democracy.8
8. See, e.g., Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(statement of William P. Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-23-17%20Marshall%20Testimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UM4E-4KPE] (critiquing originalism); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending the concept of a living constitution); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. 
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But the political right has, at least in recent decades, used process language 
more persistently and effectively than has the left, as a history of Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings demonstrates. And despite its superficial neu-
trality, process language is often used to implicitly defend (or condemn) not 
just the methodology, but also the outcomes, of some judicial decisions.
A. Back to Brown
Process language featured prominently in the confirmation hearings 
that immediately followed Brown v. Board of Education.9 It was only after 
Brown that the Senate Judiciary Committee began to hold hearings that in-
cluded the public testimony of every Supreme Court nominee. Not coinci-
dentally, the chair of the committee was Senator James Eastland of 
Mississippi, a Southern Democrat and ardent segregationist, as were two 
other vocal members of the committee—Senators Sam Ervin of North Car-
olina and John McClellan of Arkansas. These senators dominated the early 
hearings.10
The segregationist senators saw the confirmation hearings as a chance 
to rail against Brown. But for the most part, their arguments did not explicitly 
focus on segregation. Instead, they criticized Brown as an example of une-
lected judges imposing their own views and, in effect, amending the Consti-
tution. As Senator Ervin put it, in Brown, the Court improperly failed to 
“turn[ ] the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was rati-
fied” to determine the meaning of the Amendment at the time.11 In other 
words, these senators couched their unhappiness with Brown’s holding in a 
critique of its methodology.
At the same time, these senators “conflated rejection of a judicial activ-
ism no nominee could or should defend—the right to change the meaning of 
the Constitution at whim—with a particular approach to constitutional inter-
pretation—the (purported) originalism promoted by the segregationists.”12
Senator Eastland, for example, asked Justice Harlan if he “believe[d] the Su-
preme Court of the United States should change established interpretations 
of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (in series of opinions, debating appropriate methods of 
statutory interpretation).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a more in-depth discussion of this history, see Shapiro, supra note 6,
which this Part draws on.
10. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 32 (noting that these three senators, along with Republican segre-
gationist Strom Thurmond, who joined the committee in the mid-1960s, collectively asked seventy per-
cent of all substantive questions during the hearings held between 1955 and 1969).
11. Nomination of Potter Stewart to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 128 (1959); id. at 125–28.
12. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 35.
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of the Constitution to accord with the economic, political, or sociological 
views of those who from time to time constitute the membership of the 
Court?”13 Harlan, of course, said no.14
But the concerns these senators expressed about the appropriate role of 
the judiciary cannot be attributed solely, or even largely, to an abstract com-
mitment to process, separation of powers, or originalism. As everyone un-
derstood, what excited them was that they did not like what the Court was 
deciding. The results mattered at least as much as the method.15 At a time 
when overt racism was beginning to fall out of favor, however, couching the 
criticism in process language allowed the segregationists to make claims that 
were facially unobjectionable while still telegraphing their pro-segregation 
views to their followers.16
13. Nomination of John Marshall Harlan, of New York, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 140 (1955) [here-
inafter Harlan Hearing].
14. Specifically, Harlan said that he would set aside his “personal predilections so far as it is pos-
sible to do so and to decide issues before him according to the law and the facts and the Constitution.”
Id. at 141; see Shapiro, supra note 6, at 35 & n.138 (describing this exchange). The conversation contin-
ued when “Eastland responded: ‘Of course, I knew you would answer it that way.’ He then followed with 
two other questions: Did Justice Harlan believe that the Court could change ‘established interpretations’
of the Constitution, given the difficulty of amending it through the means delineated in, and ‘is the legis-
lative power as effectually denied to the courts of the United States by the Constitution as it is to the 
Executive?’ As Justice Harlan drily noted about the last question, the question ‘ought to carry its own 
answer[s].’” Id. at 35 n.138. (citation omitted) (quoting Harlan Hearing, supra note 13, at 141).
15. See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR. & LORI A. RINGHAND, SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 167–68 (2013) (describing the evolution of discussions of Brown during 
the 1960s). These senators’ criticisms were not limited to Brown. As time passed, their focus shifted to 
other aspects of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence. Here, too, these senators, now often joined by Senator 
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, complained about what they called judicial activism, defined by 
Senator Ervin as being “willing to add to the Constitution things that are not in it, and to subtract from 
the Constitution things which are in it.” Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, of New York, to Be an Asso-
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong. 155–56 (1967). And their critique of the Warren Court continued to include complaints about 
Justices the legislating from the bench, or “rewrit[ing] . . . an act of Congress . . . which clearly violated 
the constitutional provision vested in the power of the legislating Congress.” Nomination of Abe Fortas, 
of Tennessee, to Be Chief Justice of the United States and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to 
Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 129 (1968) (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary). During the later years of the Warren Court, however, the unhappy senators also complained explic-
itly about the results and consequences of some rulings. See, e.g., id. at 133–34 (Sen. Ervin complaining 
about cases precluding government discrimination against members of the Communist party and about 
criminal procedure cases, like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that “have seriously handicapped 
our law enforcement officers in apprehending criminals, and our courts in administering criminal justice 
in such a fashion as to give to the victims of crime and society the same consideration which it gives to 
those charged with perpetrating crimes”).
16. Cf. Christopher W. Schmidt, New York Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on the Civil 
Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2014) (describing how Southern resistance to the civil 
rights movement shifted to facially race-neutral legal tactics because overt racism was no longer a win-
ning political message).
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B. Process Language Today
This use of process rhetoric to both mask and signal views about results 
continues today. Debate about Roe v. Wade17 provides a simple example. 
While some attacks on Roe are explicitly results-oriented—witness the pro-
life movement writ large18—much of the legal right’s criticism of Roe fo-
cuses on the importance of judges not legislating, allowing the people and 
their elected representatives to make policy decisions, and not reading into 
the Constitution things that aren’t there.19
As a result, process language signals something to politically-engaged 
followers and observers. When a Republican presidential candidate, for ex-
ample, promises to appoint Supreme Court Justices who will not “legislate 
from the bench,” the promise, on its face, appears to be one of principled 
restraint divorced from any particular outcome. But it is not lost on partisans 
on both sides that the candidate is promising to appoint someone who will 
rule against Roe.20 Similarly, a Republican presidential candidate can com-
plain that Obergefell,21 for example, was improper judicial legislation, thus 
focusing explicitly on process language while signaling his opposition to
marriage equality.22
Process language does not necessarily have to sound like what we hear 
from the political right, as I will explore further in Part II. But the right’s 
particular claims of principled restraint and neutrality dominate discussions 
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Maria Gallagher, Roe v. Wade Will Eventually Fall and Unborn Babies Will be Pro-
tected from Abortion, LIFENEWS.COM (Nov. 10, 2017, 7:16 PM), http://www.life-
news.com/2017/11/10/roe-v-wade-will-eventually-fall-and-unborn-babies-will-be-protected-from-
abortion/ [https://perma.cc/Y4U9-KD5K].
19. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in 
our Federal Constitution deprives the people of this country of the right to determine whether the conse-
quences of abortion to the fetus and to society outweigh the burden of an unwanted pregnancy on the 
mother. Although a State may permit abortion, nothing in the Constitution dictates that a State must do 
so.”).
20. Michael C. Dorf, The Educational Function of Kabuki Confirmation Hearings, JUSTIA:
VERDICT (Mar. 22, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/03/22/educational-function-kabuki-confirma-
tion-hearings [https://perma.cc/7LV4-GJBF] (describing Republican debate in which Governor Hucka-
bee complained about Supreme Court Justices who “forgot that ‘the courts cannot legislate’”); Jeffrey 
Toobin, In McCain’s Court, NEW YORKER (May 26, 2008), https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2008/05/26/in-mccains-court [http://perma.cc/MK3W-8MJT] (describing John McCain’s 2008 
campaign speech on the judiciary); Peter Wallsten, Abortion Foes Call Bush’s Dred Scott Reference Per-
fectly Clear, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/13/nation/na-dred13 
[https://perma.cc/JP46-PLMN] (describing George W. Bush’s 2004 campaign rhetoric about the Supreme 
Court).
21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
22. See, e.g., Wednesday’s GOP Debate Transcript, Annotated, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/09/16/annotated-transcript-september-16-gop-
debate/?utm_term=.e95c5896d0ca [http://perma.cc/9VYM-FYWB] (Governor Mike Huckabee com-
plaining that the Obergefell majority was improperly legislating).
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about the proper approach to judging. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, 
this rhetoric functions as a promise of neutrality that suggests not only that 
there is only one correct way of engaging in legal and constitutional analysis, 
but also that this approach necessarily leads to objectively correct and logi-
cally deducible outcomes to difficult legal questions.23
This process language thus has implications not only for particular ju-
dicial nominees or for particular cases, but also for the legitimacy of judges 
and courts that reach results one disagrees with. At its worst, it suggests that 
judges who do not reach the “correct” results also used the wrong methods 
and so are lawless or illegitimate.24 As Richard Primus recently noted in his 
response to a conservative proposal to pack the courts by dramatically in-
creasing the number of federal judges, that proposal
depicts a judiciary that is populated, not by honorable judges who are ap-
pointed by Presidents of both parties and who often have good-faith disa-
greements, but by conservative judges on one hand and, on the other, 
Democratic-appointed judges who subvert the rule of law. In [this] view, 
the rule of law itself demands that Democratic appointees not be permitted 
to exercise judicial power.25
The court-packing proposal Primus is criticizing may be extreme, but it is 
consistent with the implication that judges who do not reach the “correct” 
results should not be judges.
Finally, the process language embraced by the right has another im-
portant feature. The Constitution itself is at the center of the rhetoric. Look 
back at Senator Grassley’s statements at the opening of Justice Gorsuch’s 
hearing. He began by talking explicitly about the Constitution’s design and 
its “delicate balance of power . . . that ensures that liberty for the people will 
endure.”26 Judges and justices who do not engage in the proper methodology, 
then, are worse than lawless—they are undermining the Constitution itself.
23. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 29–31.
24. Dorf, supra note 20 (noting that Republican candidates for office often describe judicial rulings 
they dislike as fundamentally illegitimate); Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Proposed Judgeship Bill
3 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 17-24, 2017) 
(attacking Fourth Circuit for producing “some of the most activist liberal opinions in recent years”); id.
at 5 (attacking District of Columbia Circuit for its “rubber stamp approval” of administrative action and 
decision “to facilitate the lawlessness that has characterized the administrative state under Obama’s pres-
idency”); see also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 34, 60–68 (describing implications of claiming some legal 
analysis as neutral and objective).
25. Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Cal-
abresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawre-
view.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-
judgeship-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/KUG5-XLEH] (discussing Calabresi & Hirji, supra note 24).
26. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 2.
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The political and legal right has had decades to build this edifice out of 
process language. But they have been aided by the political left’s much less 
consistent use of such language. Indeed, at the early post-Brown hearings,
the segregationist senators dominated the hearings while most senators said 
nothing.27 There was little-to-no discussion of other possible approaches to 
constitutional interpretation or statutory construction by other members of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.28 Even more recently, as evidenced at the 
Gorsuch hearing, Democrats have approached their discussion of the Court’s 
work with little explicit focus on process and much more on outcomes. But 
as I will discuss in the next Part, it does not have to be this way. It is both 
unnecessary and unwise for Democrats to cede so much process language to 
Republicans.
II. LEGISLATION, CO-EQUAL BRANCHES, AND THE CONSTITUTION
At and before the Gorsuch hearing, one of the key themes the Demo-
crats pushed was that Judge Gorsuch favored “the big guy” over “the little 
guy.”29 This line of attack was highly problematic—tactically, substantively, 
and strategically. Tactically, it was problematic in part because as a Court of 
Appeals judge, Gorsuch sat on more than 2700 cases.30 With such an enor-
mous number of cases, it was easy to find cases where he ruled for “the big 
27. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 31–38.
28. One brief exception came at the end of Justice Brennan’s hearing, when Republican Senator 
Alexander Wiley objected to Senator Eastland’s insistence on originalism. The Constitution “is not a dead 
instrument. It is meant to keep America alive in the changing world in which we live. . . . [T]he Consti-
tution is the charter of our lives and our privileges and our rights. However, it is not made to be a fetish. 
It is made to be a vital[,] dynamic thing to preserve those rights.” Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, 
Junior, of New Jersey, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 40 (1957).
29. See, e.g., Matt Flegenheimer, Democrats Line of Attack on Gorsuch: No Friend of the Little 
Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/us/politics/democrats-judge-
gorsuch-confirmation-hearing.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/YF2F-4AP4]; Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 
2017, supra note 1, at 45 (statement of Sen. Mazie Hirono, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[A]s 
I have reviewed your opinions, I have not seen that the rights of minorities are a priority for you. In fact,
a pattern jumps out at me[:] you rarely seem to find in favor of the little guy.”); see also, e.g., id. at 32 
(statement of Sen. Al Franken, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (expressing fear that Gorsuch would 
sign onto “decisions that continue to favor powerful corporate interests over the rights of average Amer-
icans”); id. at 44 (statement of Sen. Hirono) (beginning her statement by noting that the hearing was about 
“more than considering a nominee for the Supreme Court, it’s about the future of our country. It’s about 
the tens of millions of people who work hard every day, play by the rules, but don’t get ahead. It’s about 
the working poor who are one paycheck away from being in the streets.”); Senate Judiciary Committee—
Hearing, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 22, 2017, 2017 WLNR 8947139, at 68 [hereinafter Gorsuch Hearing,
Mar. 22, 2017] (statement of Sen. Franken) (explaining that Democrats were “trying to really figure out 
whether we’re going to see a continuation of this pro-corporate bias and of this bias toward big 
money . . . where the weight shifts against the little guy and for the big guy”).
30. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 56 (statement of Judge Neil Gorsuch) (noting 
that he had sat on more than 2700 cases).
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guy”—but also easy to find cases where he ruled for “the little guy”—which 
of course Gorsuch and his defenders did.31 In fact, in one of the cases that 
Democrats were concerned about for another reason—Judge Gorsuch’s ex-
plicit skepticism about Chevron deference—the judge ruled against the 
United States government and in favor of an undocumented immigrant.32
Substantively the “big-guy/little-guy” message was terrible because all 
judges sometimes rule for the big guy over the little guy. Sometimes that’s
what the law requires.33 So in this sense, the message the Democrats pushed 
was the opposite of the Republicans’ process language. This heavy focus on 
outcomes, especially without a consistent message about process and meth-
odology, played to a caricature of Democrats wanting only results-oriented 
judging, not being willing to police the boundary between the legislature and 
31. See, e.g., id. at 50 (statement of Sen. Cory Gardner) (noting a Denver Post article in which “a
Denver attorney and Democrat” described appearing before Judge Gorsuch in two cases in each of which 
“he issued a decision that most certainly focused on the little guy”); id. at 57 (statement of Judge Gorsuch) 
(“I’ve decided cases for Native Americans seeking to protect tribal lands, for class actions like one that 
ensured compensation for victims of large nuclear waste pollution problem produced by corporations in 
Colorado. I’ve ruled for disabled students, for prisoners, for the accused, for workers alleging civil rights 
violations, and for undocumented immigrants.”); Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on the 
Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 
21, 2017, 2017 WLNR 8821289, at 53 [hereinafter Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017] (statement of Judge 
Gorsuch) (“And if we’re going to pick and choose cases, out of 2,700, I could point you to so many in 
which I have found for the plaintiff in an employment action or affirmed a finding of an agency of some 
sort, for a worker or otherwise.”); id. at 81 (statement of Sen. Michael S. Lee, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (referring to a case in which Judge Gorsuch ruled in favor of a trucker who was fired for 
refusing to operate a vehicle because of safety concerns).
32. In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2016), Judge Gorsuch wrote a unani-
mous opinion rejecting a Bureau of Immigration Appeals conclusion that an undocumented immigrant 
had to spend at least ten years outside the United States before he could ask the Attorney General to grant 
him legal status. Id. at 1144–45. Separately, and only on his own behalf, he wrote a lengthy concurrence 
calling into question the constitutionality of Chevron deference. Id. at 1149–58. He wrote: “There’s an 
elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our way around it and even 
left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge 
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more 
than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to 
face the behemoth.” Id. at 1149. At his hearing, however, Judge Gorsuch explained this concurrence by 
saying that his “job as a circuit judge is when I see a problem, I tell my bosses about it. Like any good 
employee.” Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 87. He refused to say whether he actually 
agreed with the implications of his Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence. Id.
33. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Democrats’ Misguided Argument Against Gorsuch, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-15/democrats-mis-
guided-argument-against-gorsuch [http://perma.cc/M9M8-8366]. Republican senators were eager to 
make this point during the hearings. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 14 (state-
ment of Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[I]f you follow the laws and the facts 
wherever it [sic] might lead, sometimes it’s for the police, sometimes for a criminal defendant, sometimes 
it’s for a corporation. Sometimes it’s for an employee. Sometimes it’s for the government. Sometimes 
it’s against the government.”); id. at 19 (statement of Sen. Lee) (predicting that Democrats on the Com-
mittee would “pick apart some of your rulings and they’ll try to say that you’re hostile to particular types 
of claims or to particular plaintiffs”); id. at 39 (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (stating that “[g]ood judges don’t decide cases based on how big the guy is, but based on the 
law and the facts” and quoting Noah Feldman).
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the judiciary, and not caring at all about process values.34 In his opening 
speech, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch explained that “[a]n impartial 
judge focuses on the process of interpreting and applying the law according 
to objective rules. In this way, the law rather than the judge determines the 
outcome.”35 In contrast, expressly citing the Democrats’ “no friend of the 
little guy” arguments, he accused Gorsuch’s opponents as seeking “a politi-
cized judiciary.”36 As he explained, “[a] political judge . . . focuses on a de-
sired result and fashions a means of achieving it. In this way, the judge rather 
than the law often determines the outcome.”37
These arguments demonstrate why the Democratic message was strate-
gically problematic. Republicans were able to continue to signal to their 
faithful that they were trying to ensure outcomes their base would like but, 
at the same time, could maintain the claim that Gorsuch’s critics lacked a
principled approach to judging.38 And the Democratic failure to engage in 
process rhetoric was also a strategic missed opportunity. There was virtually 
no question that they could have asked or statement they could have made 
that would have led to a different outcome to Judge Gorsuch’s nomination.39
Especially given that reality, they could have and should have taken ad-
vantage of the opportunity to present their alternative vision of the Constitu-
tion and the role of the judiciary to the American people.40
34. Ilya Shapiro, Opinion, Day One of the Neil Gorsuch Hearings Was Not About Neil Gorsuch,
WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 21, 2017, 12:30 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/day-one-of-the-
neil-gorsuch-hearings-was-not-about-neil-gorsuch/article/2617950 [https://perma.cc/XXL9-N3EV] (as-
serting that the Democrats’ “results-oriented foofaraw was really quite astonishing”); Roger Pilon, Fore-
word, Judicial Confirmations and the Rule of Law, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV., at ix, xvi, xviii 
(describing Democratic senators as being explicitly interested in results instead of law).
35. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 8.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also id. at 28–29 (statement of Sen. Ted Cruz, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(“Some people view the court as a hyper powerful political branch. When they grow frustrated with the 
legislative process and the will of the people, they turn to the courts to try to see their preferred policies 
enacted. For conservatives, we understand the opposite is true. We read the Constitution and see that it 
imbues the federal judiciary with a much more modest role than the left embraces. Judges are not sup-
posed to make law. They are supposed to faithfully apply it.”). The same argument was made outside the 
hearing room. See, e.g., Pilon, supra note 34, at x.
38. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of Sen. Cruz) (arguing 
that had Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton appointed Justice Scalia’s successor, “Scalia’s legacy would 
have been in grave danger” and there would have been a “new activist Supreme Court”).
39. See Will Baude, A Note on Why Judicial Nominees Do Not Answer More Questions, WASH.
POST.: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2017/03/21/a-note-on-why-judicial-nominees-do-not-answer-more-ques-
tions/?utm_term=.3fa450fec5d0 [http://perma.cc/L68D-9LRN].
40. Cf. Dorf, supra note 20 (arguing that one benefit of confirmation hearings, including the Gor-
such hearings, is that a member of the public watching them “might learn that there is a robust debate 
about how to interpret the Constitution and federal statutes”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme 
Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 466 (noting that the hearings’ “educational function may 
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A. Making Statutes Constitutional
Nowhere was the dichotomy between Democratic and Republican rhet-
oric starker than in discussions of the courts’ role in statutory interpretation. 
Republican senators and Judge Gorsuch embraced textualism, explaining it 
as required by their commitment to the constitutionally-mandated separation 
of powers and by democratic values. Senator Lee, for example, read what he 
said was an op-ed encouraging confirmation: “Judge Gorsuch’s opinions re-
flect the principle Justice Scalia spent his career defending. That in a democ-
racy, the people[’]s elected representatives, not judges[,] get to decide what 
the laws should be—what laws we should have.”41
Senator Cornyn followed suit. “Well what sort of escapes me is if peo-
ple who argue somehow that judges aren’t bound by the text of the statute,” 
he said, “it is the text of a statute that Congress votes on. So how in the world, 
if it’s something else other than the text, that ought to direct the outcome, 
how can anybody have that kind of fair notice that we depend on . . . ?”42
Judge Gorsuch himself made similar statements. In his opening statement, 
for example, he explained that “it’s for this body, the people[’]s representa-
tives, to make new laws, for the executive to ensure those laws are faithfully 
executed, and for neutral and independent judges to apply the law in the peo-
ple[’]s disputes.”43
All of these arguments, whether made by Republican senators or by 
Judge Gorsuch himself, incorporate a claim of fidelity to the Constitution 
into the discussion of how statutes should be interpreted and applied. Dem-
ocrats could have and should have similarly focused their own statutory ar-
guments more robustly on process rhetoric and constitutional questions. And 
they could have done so while maintaining focus on the consequences of 
court decisions for real people. More specifically, Democrats could have 
pointed out more aggressively than they did that some uses of textualism can 
actually undermine Congress’s lawmaking authority, especially when it 
seems to mask a judge’s own ideological agenda.
be paramount”); see also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 68–71 (arguing for using the hearings to promote the 
idea that deciding difficult legal questions is not an objective or neutral enterprise).
41. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 76.
42. Id. at 68. There are numerous other examples. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra 
note 1, at 44 (statement of Sen. Thom Tillis, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“The activists are us. 
We get elected. We go out to the people, we convince them we want to make changes, we pass laws. 
Your job is to interpret them as a judge. And I believe that you [told] me that you fully understood that 
your role fell squarely within Article [III] and then mine fell squarely within Article [I], and you saw the 
very bright line between the two. . . . [Y]our quote was, ‘It is for Congress and not the courts to write new 
laws. It is the role of judges to apply, not alter, the work of the people’s representatives.’”); id. at 28–29 
(statement of Sen. Cruz).
43. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 56.
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This missed opportunity was exemplified by the repeated discussions 
of TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department 
of Labor,44 better known as the “frozen trucker case.” TransAm, a case from 
Judge Gorsuch’s tenure on the Tenth Circuit, was a cause celebre for Dem-
ocrats during the hearing.45 The facts were compelling. A trucker, Alphonse 
Maddin, employed by TransAm, was driving through Illinois in subzero tem-
peratures when the brakes on the trailer he was pulling froze. He reported the 
problem to TransAm and, following the company’s instructions, waited for 
repair assistance for more than two hours. Unfortunately, the truck’s heater
was broken; he began feeling numb and was having difficulty breathing. 
Concerned for his safety, Maddin called his supervisor, who told him either 
to wait or to drive the truck with its full trailer. But Maddin believed that he 
was at risk of freezing if he stayed in the truck and he believed that driving 
the full trailer with its frozen brakes would be dangerous. He unhooked his 
cab and drove away, leaving the trailer and its cargo behind, against the or-
ders of his supervisor. TransAm fired him.
The issue in the case was whether Maddin had been unlawfully fired 
under the federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA). The Tenth 
Circuit held, in a 2–1 opinion, that the relevant federal agency properly found 
that Maddin should not have been fired. Specifically, the court invoked a 
provision of the STAA that “makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge 
an employee who ‘refuses to operate a vehicle because . . . the employee has 
a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the public 
because of the vehicle’s hazardous safety or security condition.’”46 Judge 
Gorsuch dissented.
The disagreement between the TransAm majority and Judge Gorsuch 
turned on the word “operate.” TransAm argued that Maddin had not “refused 
to operate” the truck because he had, in fact, driven the cab away. The ma-
jority concluded, however, that the word readily carried a meaning consistent 
with a variety of different ways an employee might use a vehicle.47 The court 
observed that its reading was consistent with the express statutory purpose, 
44. 833 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2016).
45. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 45 (statement of Sen. Hirono) (dis-
cussing TransAm).
46. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 833 F.3d at 1211 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2015))
47. The court explained that “the refusal-to-operate provision could cover a situation in which an 
employee refuses to use his vehicle in the manner directed by his employer even if that refusal results in 
the employee driving the vehicle.” Id. at 1211–12. For example, “an employee who partially unloads an 
overweight trailer in direct contravention of his employer’s instruction to continue pulling the overweight 
trailer on the public roadways, has refused to operate the vehicle for purposes of the STAA even if the 
employee completes the trip after unloading the trailer.” Id. at 1212 (citing Beveridge v. Waste Stream 
Envtl., Inc., ARB No. 97-137, ALJ No. 97-STA-15, 1997 WL 806522, at *1 (ARB Dec. 23, 1997)).
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which Congress had included in the law itself, to “promote the safe operation 
of commercial motor vehicles,” “to minimize dangers to the health of oper-
ators of commercial motor vehicles,” and “to ensure increased compliance 
with traffic laws and with . . . commercial motor vehicle safety and health 
regulations and standards.”48 And it pointed to “a dictionary definition of the 
word ‘operate’ . . . [as] mean[ing] to ‘control the functioning of.’”49 The 
court concluded that “[t]his definition clearly encompasses activities other 
than driving.”50
In dissent, Judge Gorsuch argued that the statute necessarily carried a 
different meaning. The dictionary definition he relied on defined “operate” 
as “[t]o cause or actuate the working of; to work (a machine, etc.).”51 Thus, 
he concluded, because Maddin had driven the cab away, he had operated it, 
instead of refusing to operate it, and was thus unprotected by the statute. In 
addition, because Judge Gorsuch found the word “operate” to be plain and 
unambiguous, he declined to look to statutory purpose, which he described 
as an “ephemeral and generic” concern for “health and safety.”52 He did not 
address the more specific concerns related to truck drivers that Congress in-
cluded in the statute itself.
Finally, Judge Gorsuch noted that even were the statutory purpose clear, 
it was a mistake to assume that Congress intended to pursue that purpose to 
its “absolute and seemingly logical ends.”53 Legislating involves compro-
mise and negotiation, he said, and “it is our obligation to enforce the terms 
of that compromise as expressed in the law itself, not to use the law as a sort 
of springboard to combat all perceived evils lurking in the neighborhood.”54
He went on to speculate about various explanations for Congress’s failure to 
address Mr. Maddin’s circumstances:
Maybe Congress found it easier to agree that an employee has a right to 
sit still in response to his employer’s order to operate an unsafe vehicle 
rather than try to agree on a code detailing when and how an employee 
can operate a vehicle in a way he thinks safe and appropriate but his em-
ployer does not. Maybe Congress would not have been able to agree to the 
48. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 31131(a)).
49. Id. at 1212 n.4 (quoting Operate, OXFORD DICTIONARIES PRO, http://www.oxforddictionar-
ies.com/us/definition/american_english/operate [http://perma.cc/Z9KP-SLE5]).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1216 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 848 (2d
ed. 1989)).
52. Id. at 1217. An additional underlying disagreement between the majority and Judge Gorsuch 
was whether the administrative agency was entitled to any deference in interpreting the statute. Id. at 
1212 (majority opinion); id. at 1216 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1217.
54. Id.
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latter sort of code at all. Or maybe it just found the problem too time con-
suming and other matters more pressing. Or maybe it just didn’t think 
about the problem at all.55
The main Democratic message about this case was that it was a prime 
example of Gorsuch’s disregard for “the little guy.”56 This intense focus al-
most exclusively on the outcome of the case, however, served to reinforce 
the Republicans’ process language. Republicans could shake their heads 
sadly at Mr. Maddin’s plight while arguing that Judge Gorsuch’s unwilling-
ness to be swayed by the sad facts of the case demonstrated his unwavering 
commitment to the rule of law, the proper role of the judge, and the consti-
tutionally required separation of powers.57
There are other ways the Democrats could have talked about TransAm
that are just as process-oriented as the approach taken by the Republicans, 
while also acknowledging the real-world consequences of the decision. Ra-
ther than argue primarily that Gorsuch’s dissent was callous, the Democrats 
could and should have argued, like the majority in that case, that it was wrong 
on its own terms. As Justice Scalia himself explained, textualism is not the 
same thing as “strict constructionism.”58 The appropriate reading of a statute 
is not necessarily the one that reads the language as narrowly as possible.
Statutory purpose and textual context matter. Here, the statute itself 
contained a congressional statement of purpose. And that statement was not 
the “ephemeral and generic” desire to protect health and safety that Judge 
Gorsuch dismissed as, essentially, the justification for all statutes and thus 
not useful. Rather, Congress articulated a specific purpose to protect the 
health and safety of particular workers in a particular industry with particular 
dangers—and to preserve the safety of the roadways. Indeed, some senators 
noted this. Senator Hirono, for example, briefly pointed to this flaw in Judge 
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 42 (statement of Sen. Richard Blu-
menthal, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting his concern about what Gorsuch’s opinion in 
TransAm meant for his approach to “broader issues . . . in worker’s safety and consumer protection”); 
Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 102 (statement of Sen. Franken) (insisting that Gor-
such address what he would have done in the position of the trucker); Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, 
supra note 29, at 28 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
57. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 80 (statement of Sen. Lee) (prais-
ing Judge Gorsuch for recognizing that he was “bound by the law” even where he might conclude that 
“the law is an ass”); id. at 169 (statement of Sen. Tillis) (“[Y]ou are not here to have heart. You [are] here 
to judge the law, you’re here to judge the Constitution, and I appreciate that about you because I suspect 
you’ve got a really big heart.”).
58. Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton 
University 98 (Mar. 8 & 9, 1995), https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/scalia97.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RBX6-W8FT] (“A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed 
leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”).
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Gorsuch’s TransAm dissent. She argued that Gorsuch had “fixated on the 
plain meaning of the word operate despite choosing a definition out of con-
text and using it odds with the clear purpose of the statute.”59
Ignoring the “clear purpose of the statute” should be understood to raise 
just as many constitutional concerns as does “rewriting” it, and that is an 
argument Democrats should have pushed. As Senator Hirono explained, “if 
judges are gonna work this hard to strain the . . . text of a law to undermine 
the purpose, which was for . . . safety . . . that makes it pretty tough for any 
laws that Congress passes or will pass to really be effective in protecting 
American workers.”60 If the judiciary’s job is to defer to Congress’s deci-
sions about “what the laws should be—what laws we should have,”61 then it 
is important for courts to try to give effect to those decisions.62 Unearthing a 
dictionary definition that allows for a particularly crabbed reading of the 
STAA is not consistent with that role.
This argument also directly responds to the notion that Gorsuch’s dis-
sent was respectful of separation of powers and the judicial role. Indeed, the 
Democrats could have explained in more detail that his approach would have 
undermined the law Congress passed, and his hypothesizing about what 
might have happened during its enactment should not have superseded the 
statutory purpose that Congress included in the law itself.
Democrats also could have more explicitly and persistently used the 
Trans-Am case as an example of how textualism can be a smokescreen, con-
scious or not, for a judge imposing his own ideology. Senator Hirono again 
pointed the way, arguing that Judge Gorsuch had gone to “great lengths to 
disagree with [his] colleagues on the Tenth Circuit so that [he] can ex-
plain . . . some obscure or novel[ ] . . . interpretation of a particular word in 
[a] statu[te],” putting “ideology over common sense.”63
59. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 45. Senator Hirono’s statement, however, 
came in the middle of a much longer discussion about Gorsuch’s mistreatment of the “little guy.” Id. at 
45–46; see also Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 53 (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“We 
had a pretty clear legislative intent for a driver who feels he’s endangering his life perhaps, and you 
dismiss it.”).
60. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 157.
61. Id. at 76 (statement of Sen. Lee).
62. Justice Breyer has made this argument explicitly and in some detail, arguing that judges should 
focus on purpose and consequences in statutory interpretation. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR 
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 88–105 (2010) [hereinafter BREYER, DEMOCRACY]; id. at 102 (“A
court that looks to purposes is a court that works as a partner with Congress.”).
63. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 45.
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These critiques of textualism are hardly new. Moreover, as critics of 
textualism argue, it is very hard to pass a law, so the kind of “statutory dia-
logue” between courts and the legislature that Gorsuch praised64 is unrealis-
tic in all but the most high-profile of cases, and Congress can’t realistically 
write detailed codes that account for every conceivable factual circumstance. 
As a result, the courts can permanently hobble a law by misreading it. And 
turning law into a game of “gotcha” undermines democratic accountability.65
My point here is not to rehash these arguments about textualism, but to sug-
gest that they can, and should, play an important role in the rhetoric sur-
rounding confirmation hearings.
Indeed, it is notable just how little time senators of either party spent 
during the Gorsuch hearing attempting to defend Congress’s authority. 
When Democratic senators raised concerns about Shelby County v. Holder,
in which the Roberts Court rejected Congress’s factual determinations as in-
sufficient to support the application of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to 
certain jurisdictions,66 they appropriately focused on the admittedly pro-
found results and impact of that decision.67 But they did not also emphasize 
that the Shelby County majority exhibited no deference for congressional 
factfinding and policy judgments about how to enforce constitutional 
rights.68 In contrast, during Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation hearing, 
two Republican senators complained that the Rehnquist Court had rejected 
Congress’s decision, on the basis of an extensive factual record, to abrogate 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act.69
Separation of powers is not intrinsically a liberal or a conservative idea.
Democrats should not fail to respond when nominees or Republican senators 
claim that only one particular approach to statutory interpretation properly 
respects that principle, and they should explicitly resist the suggestion that 
only the conservative approaches (and results) are consistent with the rule of 
64. Id. at 56.
65. Cf. BREYER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 62, at 94–96.
66. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
67. See Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 29, at 100–01, 142–43 (statement of Sen. 
Hirono); id. at 128–29 (statement of Sen. Franken).
68. Senator Franken did complain about some of Justice Scalia’s comments about Congress during 
oral argument, saying that they exhibited “a contempt for Congress” and “a willingness to engage 
in . . . judicial activism.” Id. at 128.
69. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 217–21 (statement of Sen. 
Mike DeWine, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 355–56 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
2018] THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS 469
law.70 More specifically, Democrats should ground their arguments about 
the role of judges and courts in the Constitution’s implicit promise of a func-
tional and responsive government.71 The Constitution belongs to us all, and 
as the next subpart also explores, Democrats should insist on that.
B. The Shared Narrative of the Constitution
During Justice Gorsuch’s hearing, the nominee and Republican senators 
defended originalism as the only legitimate method of constitutional inter-
pretation. Specifically, they argued that the role of the judiciary is to identify 
and remain true to the original public meaning of the document and amend-
ments.72 But of course originalism has been extensively criticized as, for ex-
ample, inconsistent with the Framers’ intent, as fatally indeterminate, and as 
allowing judges to mask the inevitable value-laden judgments they make be-
hind ostensibly neutral rhetoric; there are other principled approaches to in-
terpreting and applying the Constitution.73
As with textualism and statutory interpretation, it is not my goal to re-
hash these arguments here. But also as with statutory interpretation, the 
Democratic responses to the Republicans’ originalist claims during the Gor-
such hearing often missed opportunities to claim their own fidelity to the rule 
of law and the Constitution. Democratic senators’ questions and statements 
tended to focus on case law and outcomes, asking whether, for example, 
Judge Gorsuch agreed with the outcome in seminal cases like Brown v. 
Board of Education, but without explicitly tying those cases to the Constitu-
tion itself. And again, this approach unnecessarily ceded the rhetoric of both 
judicial process and constitutional fidelity to the political right.
One example of this pattern is found in Senator Blumenthal’s extended 
attempt to get Judge Gorsuch to say whether he thought that a number of key 
cases, including Brown, Griswold v. Connecticut,74 Loving v. Virginia,75 and
70. See Calabresi & Hirji, supra note 24; Primus, supra note 25.
71. BREYER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 62, at xii (explaining the Framers’ vision of a “workable 
democracy”).
72. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 88–89 (statement of Judge Gor-
such); Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 29, at 72–73 (statements of Sen. Ben Sasse, Member, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Judge Gorsuch).
73. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009);
STRAUSS, supra note 8, at 7–31; BREYER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 62, at 76–79.
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Lawrence v. Texas,76 were rightly decided.77 Even as to Brown, Judge Gor-
such resisted answering directly, insisting repeatedly that the cases were 
precedents of the United States Supreme Court. But throughout the discus-
sion, Senator Blumenthal made no assertions about why the Constitution re-
quired the results in those cases. Blumenthal probably assumed that most 
Americans, and certainly most Democrats, agree with the outcomes of those 
cases—but explaining why they are required by the Constitution – and why 
some originalists might say otherwise—would have added rhetorical and po-
litical heft to his argument.
Or consider Senator Klobuchar’s questions to Judge Gorsuch about 
originalism. She began by pressing him on whether he agreed with Chief 
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland that the Constitution must “be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”78 Judge Gorsuch explained 
that in his view, “the Constitution doesn’t change, the world around us 
changes and we have to understand the Constitution and apply it in light of 
our current circumstances.”79 Senator Klobuchar went on to ask him a series 
of questions about issues in which the language and original meaning of the 
Constitution would lead to results that most Americans would consider bi-
zarre—whether the Air Force is constitutional, for example, or whether a 
woman can be President.80 Although Judge Gorsuch was often very cagey 
about answering questions about particular issues—witness his refusal to re-
spond directly to Senator Blumenthal—he did acknowledge that a woman 
can be President and he said that “the generals of the Air Force can rest 
easy.”81
Senator Klobuchar’s point was an important one about what she called 
“selective originalism.”82 Sometimes judges who claim to be originalists in-
sist on the original public meaning of the language of the Constitution, but 
sometimes they do not.83 The point would have been stronger, however, if 
she or other Democrats had more forcefully made claims about how judges 
should interpret and apply the Constitution, and why the questions she asked 
Judge Gorsuch demonstrate the limits of originalism.
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. See Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 29, at 88–93.
78. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 88.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 88–90.
81. Id. at 89.
82. Id. at 90.
83. Id. Brown itself is an excellent example of this reality. Segregated schools were common and 
uncontroversial when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. See STRAUSS, supra note 8, at 12, 78 
(explaining this history).
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A final example comes from one of Senator Feinstein’s question to 
Judge Gorsuch. She asked him if he “agree[d] with Justice Scalia’s state-
ments that . . . originalism means there is no protection for women or gays 
or lesbians under the Equal Protection Clause because this was not the intent 
or understanding of those who drafted the 14th Amendment in 1868?”84
Judge Gorsuch responded by saying that the language of the clause controls 
and that the intentions of the drafters “matter[ ] not a whit” because “[t]he 
law they drafted promises equal protection of the laws to all persons.”85 And
he added that this promise “is maybe the most radical guarantee in all of the 
Constitution and maybe in all of human history.”86
Gorsuch’s claim here is one that Democrats should have embraced and 
expanded on; it articulates a vision of the Constitution that they can and do 
champion.87 The rest of Senator Feinstein’s questions in this exchange, how-
ever, focused largely on her concerns about how Gorsuch would rule on 
abortion rights and, to a lesser extent, the right to refuse medical treatment.88
These are important issues. But they returned to a focus largely on results. 
Senator Feinstein did not talk explicitly about what the Constitution itself 
requires, about its decidedly imperfect but aspirational origins, or about its 
ongoing evolution.
The Democrats could and should have pressed a vision that portrays the 
Constitution as an aspirational and inspirational document that was deeply 
flawed not only as originally drafted, but also as originally applied.89 They
can and should insist on constitutional commitments to equality and liberty,
tying them directly to the cases, like Brown, Griswold, Loving, and Law-
rence, as well as Roe and Obergefell, about which Judge Gorsuch de-
murred.90 Democrats can also point to other important constitutional 
values—in particular to the Constitution’s creation and preservation of a na-
tional polity and to its commitments about how to resolve political disagree-
ments without violence. And they can articulate principled and constrained 
84. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 29, at 10.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 11.
87. See, e.g., The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2010) (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (describing aspirational and imperfect nature 
of Constitution and its historical development).
88. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 29, at 11–13.
89. See, e.g., BREYER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 62, at 32–48 (discussing Dred Scott).
90. See, e.g., Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 31, at 107 (Justice Gorsuch demurring 
on Roe in colloquy with Sen. Franken); id. at 163 (demurring on Obergefell in colloquy with Sen. Hirono); 
Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 29, at 76–81 (in colloquy with Sen. Coons, demurring on
all cases noted and other cases discussed earlier in this Article).
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approaches to constitutional interpretation that are animated by these values 
and commitments and consistent with the rule of law.91 That’s process lan-
guage, and it appropriately refuses to concede either the rhetoric or reality of 
constitutional fidelity to the political right.
CONCLUSION
Commitment to the rule of law and to the Constitution are potent themes 
in Supreme Court confirmation hearings. And there is reason to believe both 
that the American people pay attention to the hearings and that they share 
those commitments.92 But as the Gorsuch hearing illustrates, Democrats 
have recently allowed Republicans to suggest, and sometimes to say explic-
itly, that only the right has a principled approach to constitutional deci-
sionmaking.
This is a dangerous mistake. Americans may understand and accept that 
Supreme Court Justices exercise discretion, and even that this discretion is 
informed by ideology, but they also appropriately expect that discretion to 
be exercised in a principled manner.93 Democratic senators should therefore 
be prepared to discuss the many principled objections and alternatives to the 
textualism and originalism often claimed by the right. Democrats should re-
ject the notion that only one approach is consistent with the rule of law. And 
they should do this even (or especially) when, as with Justice Gorsuch, Sen-
ate confirmation is inevitable.
The hearings are a chance to speak to the American people about the 
Constitution. And Democrats should not underestimate the importance of the 
91. See, e.g., id. at 80–87 (setting forth Justice Breyer’s “pragmatic approach”); STRAUSS, supra
note 8, at 33–49 (explaining common law constitutionalism).
92. In a study of the Alito hearings, 51.9 percent of survey respondents followed the Alito confir-
mation process “either very or somewhat closely” and only 22.2 percent said that “they paid relatively 
little attention to the process.” JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND 
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 71 (2009); see
also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 64–65 (discussing Gibson and Caldeira’s study).
93. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 214 (2011) (finding, in a national representative sur-
vey, that “the American people seem to accept that judicial decisionmaking can be discretionary and 
grounded in ideologies, but also principled and sincere”). Even more recently, Gibson and another co-
author have found that Americans’ views of the Supreme Court are negatively affected by what they 
perceive as the politicization of the Court, which is distinct from the appropriate role of principled dis-
cretion. See also James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory: What Roles do 
Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court Legit-
imacy?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 592, 612–13 (2017) (finding that Americans distinguish between 
principled discretion and appropriate politicization); Shapiro, supra note 6, at 64–66 (discussing Gibson 
and co-authors’ findings and implications).
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Constitution itself as a political and cultural symbol.94 Indeed, they should 
embrace their commitment to what Senator Coons called “our nation’s sec-
ular scripture.”95 No less than the political right, the left has a story to tell 
about the Constitution. And at this time of political polarization, trying to 
find at least a partially shared story, with the Constitution at the center, may 
be necessary for the ongoing vitality of our imperfect and deeply aspirational 
democratic enterprise.
94. Cf. Christopher W. Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons from the Tea 
Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523, 533–39 (2011) (describing centrality of the Constitution to the Tea 
Party’s rise).
95. Gorsuch Hearing, Mar. 20, 2017, supra note 1, at 37.
